In our crowdsourced manifesto of policies people wanted in place, we discussed worker co-determination:
Workers’ rights
We will require half of the board to be assigned to worker representatives for companies with 50+ employees, including all resorts. We will legally enshrine regulations for minimum standards of wages, working conditions, and hours for private companies as well as public. Companies will be required to provide workers’ compensation for injuries on the job.
So we’re reprinting some material from online about what worker co-determination is and how we might start.
What is co-determination?
Codetermination is the practice of workers of an enterprise having the right to vote for representatives on the board of directors in a company. It also refers to staff having binding rights in work councils on issues in their workplace. The practice of board level representation is widespread in developed democracies. The first laws requiring worker voting rights passed in 1854. Most countries with codetermination laws have single-tier board of directors in their corporate law (such as Sweden, France or the Netherlands), while a number in central Europe (particularly Germany and Austria) have two-tier boards.
Most laws apply to companies over a certain size, from Denmark at 20 employees, to Germany over 500 (for one-third representation) and 2000 (for just under one half), to France over 5000 employees. This is to minimize the burden for small businesses while ensuring that huge corporations, which represents a large proportion of the economy, have worker and stakeholder representation,
Codetermination gives workers a voice alongside shareholders. Worker co-ownership would also give them a stake in the company, making them shareholders as well. Laws could mandate a certain percentage stake in companies as shares owned by workers, who receive as dividends a proportion of the fruits of their labor instead of it all going to the wealthy.
In economies with codetermination, workers in large companies may form special bodies known as works councils. In smaller companies they may elect worker representatives who act as intermediaries in exercising the workers’ rights of being informed or consulted on decisions concerning employee status and rights. They also elect or select worker representatives in managerial and supervisory organs of companies.
In codetermination systems the employees are given seats on a board of directors in one-tier management systems, or seats in a supervisory board and sometimes management board in two-tier management systems.
In two-tier systems the seats in supervisory boards are usually limited to one to three members. In some systems the employees can select one or two members of the supervisory boards, but a representative of shareholders is always the president and has the deciding vote. An employee representatives on management boards are not present in all economies. They are always limited to a Worker-Director, who votes only on matters concerning employees.
In one-tier systems with codetermination the employees usually have only one or two representatives on a board of directors. Sometimes they are also given seats in certain committees (e.g. the audit committee). They never have representatives among the executive directors.
The German stakeholder system
The German stakeholder system of co-determination, which gives legal rights to workers to co-manage corporations, has held back the forces of short-termism1 that have dominated American corporations for the past three decades, driven our inequality crisis, and weakened our economy.
A national law requiring the boards of public companies to include worker representatives—a key element of co-determination—would, in one fell swoop, upend our current shareholder-oriented corporate governance model and redefine it as a stakeholder system, creating resilience against the pressures of short-termism.
Workers especially, who are investing in companies with their own labor on a daily basis, have a legitimate claim as corporate stakeholders, and it will serve companies, and society more broadly, if we—on the left at least—felt empowered enough to stake this claim.
There are other policy options besides co-determination, particularly different worker ownership models, including employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) and cooperatives, that would also combat short-termism. However, the larger point remains: Any benefits provided to workers that lack meaningful stakeholder decision-power will fail to foster a sustainable, long-term oriented system for any stakeholders, including workers.
The main differences concern the structure of corporate boards and the influence of workers on decision making at the top. Companies in English-speaking countries tend to have one board, whose chairman is often also the chief executive officer. Employees, meanwhile, have little to no say in strategy. The company’s fiduciaries must act only in the interests of their main “stakeholders,” which are their shareholders. At German companies, all this is different.

Germany made it compulsory to have one board of executive officers and another, separate, board of supervisors. This independent non-executive panel had the duty to hold management accountable and to protect the interests of shareholders.
The model obliges directors to consider all stakeholders in corporate decisions. Thus German boards must, in theory, heed the concerns not only of shareholders but also of employees, creditors, suppliers, and local governments, and should take a long-term perspective that stretches over generations.
Co-determination, in principle and practice
For most large public and private companies in Germany, i.e. those with more than 2,000 employees, half the seats on the supervisory board go to elected worker representatives, mainly drawn from the company’s work council as well as trade unions. The other half go to shareholder representatives. There is also a supervisory board chair, usually representing capital, who can cast a tie-breaking vote. In practice, the chair rarely exercises this power, preferring to allow the consensus-building process to play itself out.
Co-determination is intimately linked to the dual-board system. If employee representatives were tasked with debating management decisions alongside their bosses on a unified board, irresolvable conflicts of interest would be the likely result.
However, employee representatives and shareholders working on equal footing in an oversight capacity has been a beneficial set-up for labor relations and even for competitiveness, by some measures. German workers have historically been among the least strike-prone in Europe. As a rule, employee representatives feel secure enough in their authority to give a fair hearing to proposals from their fellow stakeholders.






