this won’t be a long post. like i’ve said elsewhere, i’m not going to repeat arguments that others have made much more eloquently and more thoroughly than i have: you can find strong cases for affirmative action on the internet. i just wanted to highlight this fascinating little detail from some of the research on women in the workplace.
i’ve added a screenshot below, but the short version is that there’s strong support for the quota argument: that imbalances in the workplace such as a dearth of women in senior roles isn’t because men just have more ability than women, that it’s because of social or cultural factors holding women back, and that something like quotas mean that talented women, who otherwise might have been passed up for less talented men, are now able to get the roles they would deserve on merit.
the common argument against affirmative action is the idea that it’s not a meritocracy and that guaranteed positions for women will bring in less qualified women by squeezing out more qualified men. i mean, for starters, i know, looking around at all the brilliant and talented women i know, that the distribution of women in positions of power is nowhere near the actual distribution of ability or talent.
a common argument against affirmative action is that the natural order of things is a meritocracy because it technically is one, and then ignoring the fact that context exists or that policies happen in society, not in a vacuum. (technically, i’m allowed to contest elections too. by the letter of the law. if you ignore that context exists). but regardless, let’s check. does the evidence suggest that: a) as things stand, more talented women get squeezed out in favor of men with less ability as a result of some kind of societal sexism, or b) that with a quota, less talented women take up slots that, ostensibly, would have gone to other men if it were based purely on merit?
it’s not a perfect proxy, but the proportion of women on the board of a major company (over a few hundred companies, to smooth out results and be sure we aren’t seeing a freak case) roughly reflects corporate governance policy built to retain and promote women. in a control case, where companies operate in a perfect meritocracy, the gender balance making up a company’s top management would have zero correlation with its performance, because in all of them the top ranks would be filled by those who most merited it. if departments heavy on women perform significantly better, it’d be a strong case for the argument that these women are taking the place of less talented replacements. if departments heavy on women perform significantly worse, it’d be a strong indicator that these promoted women are taking the place of more talented male candidates.
let’s take a look at the results… there we go. the quartile of firms with the largest proportion of women in top management had a return 35.1% higher than the quartile with the lowest proportion of women. odds are, talented women around you aren’t getting their fair dues. policies that actively identify, retain, train, and promote talented women help address some of that to make it more meritocratic. bring on the quotas, and make them sizable.

there’s more:

this is also borne out in a study carried out for indian village councils by two of the world’s leading development economists, abhijit banerjee and esther duflo:
One specific example of such top-down intervention is to restrict whom villagers can elect as representatives. These restrictions may be needed in order to ensure adequate representation of the minorities, and they make a difference.
India’s system of village government, or gram panchayat (the GP, or village council), has such restrictions. Elected every five years at the local level, the GP administers the local collective infrastructure, such as wells, school buildings, local roads, and so on. To protect underrepresented groups, the rules reserve leadership positions in a fraction of GPs for women and for members of various minorities (including the lower castes). If the elites had completely captured the panchayat, however, mandated representation of women or minorities would make no difference. The real bosses of the villages would continue to rule, presumably fronted by their wives, or by their lower-caste servants, whenever the bosses themselves are prevented from running for office.
Indeed, when Raghabendra Chattopadhyay, of the Indian Institute of Management in Kolkata, and Esther embarked on a panchayat survey in 2000 to find out whether women leaders invested in different types of local infrastructure, they were warned by everyone, from the minister of rural development in Kolkata to their survey staff (and including many local academics), that this was a futile quest. The show, everyone claimed, was run by pradhan patis (the husband of the pradhan, or chief of the GP), and the shy, often illiterate women, many of them with their heads covered, were certainly not making any decisions on their own.
The survey, however, revealed the opposite. In the state of West Bengal, under the quota system, one-third of the GPs were randomly selected every five years to be “reserved” for women to be the village head: In these villages, only women can run for office. Chattopadhyay and Esther compared the local infrastructure available in reserved and unreserved villages, just two years after the reservation system was first put in place.27 They found that women invested much more of their (fixed) budget in the local infrastructure that women wanted—in West Bengal, that meant roads and drinking water—and less in schools. They then replicated these findings in Rajasthan, reputed to be one of India’s most male chauvinist states. There, they found that women wanted closer sources of drinking water above all, and men wanted roads. And sure enough, women leaders invested more in drinking water, less on roads.
Further studies elsewhere in India have made it clear that women leaders almost always make a difference. Furthermore, over time, women also appear to be doing more than men with the same limited budget and are reported to be less inclined to take bribes. Yet whenever we present these results in India, there is someone who will tell us this has to be wrong: They have gone personally to a village and have talked to a woman pradhan, under her husband’s supervision; they have seen political posters where the picture of the candidate’s husband figured more prominently than the candidate herself. They are right: We, too, have had those conversations and seen those posters. Ensuring women run as political leaders is not the instant revolution that it is sometimes made out to be, with powerful women aggressively taking charge and reforming their villages. The women who are elected are often related to someone who was in politics before. They are less likely to chair the village meetings, and they speak less at them. They are less educated and less politically experienced. But despite all this, and despite the evident prejudice they face, many women are quietly taking charge.
Voters adjust their views based on what they see happening on the ground, even when they are initially biased. The female policy makers in India are an example. Whereas the Delhi elite remained convinced that women could not be empowered by legal fiat, citizens on the ground were much more open to the opposite view.
Before the policy of setting aside one-third of the seats of panchayat leaders to women, very few women were ever elected to a position of power. In West Bengal, in GPs that had never been reserved for women leaders, 10 percent of the pradhans in 2008 were women. Not surprisingly, the share jumped to 100 percent when the seats were reserved for women. But, once a seat that had been reserved went back to being open, women were more likely to be elected again: The share of women elected increased to 13 percent for currently unreserved seats that had been reserved once in the past and to 17 percent if they had been reserved twice. The same thing applied to city government representatives in Mumbai.
One reason for this is that voters’ attitudes toward women changed. In West Bengal, to measure prejudices about competence, villagers were asked to listen to a recording of a leader’s speech. All villagers heard the same speech, but some heard it spoken in a male voice, and others in a female voice. After they heard the recording, they were asked to judge its quality. In villages that had never had reserved seats for women, and therefore had no experience of a woman leader, men who heard the “male” speech gave higher approval ratings than those who heard the “female” speech. On the other hand, in villages that had been reserved for women before, men tended to like the “female” speech better. Men did recognize that women were capable of implementing good policies and changed their opinion of women leaders. The temporary reservation of one-third of the seats for women could thus lead not only to some additional drinking water sources but also to a permanent transformation of the role of women in politics.
so what we’re seeing here from having quotas in government is:
- women did more with the same limited budget and took less bribes
- voter attitudes towards women improve, especially views on competence
- more women got elected, even after the quota was removed
- previously restricted or less empowered women grew into their roles and took charge
- men recognized women can implement good policies and changed their view of female leaders
- it directly led to policy changes women wanted but hadn’t got under mostly male leadership
- even a temporary quota caused a permanent shift in the role of women in politics
it also seems pretty obvious. if you believe men and women are both equally capable, then the distribution of figures in power should roughly reflect their distribution in society. we should be seeing a roughly fifty-fifty split, most likely. if any given capable person has an equal likelihood of being a man or a woman. since there’s such a massive gender imbalance, then women must be facing some kind of structural advantage. the only other option is women being less capable, so if you still defend the idea of it being a meritocracy, you need to question whether that’s your ultimate belief.
arguing that this is just how the dice fell in a genuine meritocracy is ridiculous. in an equal society with perfect meritocracy, here are the odds that representation of women in parliament would be only around 6.5%:

yeah, that’s not coincidence.


